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Notes
CRAWLING OUT FROM UNDER BOULDER
Priorto 1982, commentators generallyassumed that most municipalitiesenjoyed
antitrustimmunity under the Parker v. Brown state action doctrine. In Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, however, the Supreme Court held that
home rule cities are subject to antitrust review. This Note supports Boulder and
examines lower court interpretationsof the decision. The Note proposes a reasonableness standardofreview of municipalaction. It also discusses the recentfurorover
exposing municipalities to treble damage liability and concludes that Congress
should completely abolish trebling.

INTRODUCTION

IN COMMUNITY Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,' the
Supreme Court took another step in its ongoing redefinition of
state action immunity 2 -it extended Sherman Act 3 coverage to
home rule cities. 4 For nearly a decade, the Court has been permitting private antitrust suits against parties once thought immune
under Parkerv. Brown.5 What one commentator has labeled "antitrust imperialism,"6 and another "dwindling sovereign privilege
in general, ' 7 has generated a line of cases in which the Court has
reconciled state and local regulation with the procompetitive ideals embodied in the federal antitrust statutes.8 Broadly, this reconciliation preserves the regulatory prerogatives of the states, while
subjecting self-regulation by state subdivisions, 9 local govern1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
2. See infra note 28.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
4. See infra note 72.
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND
LocAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 484 (2d. ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL SYSTEM]; Susman & White, The PersFectiveofa PlaintisLawyer, in ANTITRUST &
LocAL GOVERNMENT 22-24 (J. Siena ed. 1982); infra notes 28-68 and accompanying text.
6. AreedaAntitrust Immunity/or "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV.
435, 454 (1981).
7. Spiegel, Local Governments and the Terror ofAntitrust, 69 A.B.A. J. 163, 166
(1982); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 977, 984-87 (4th ed. 1971); see
also FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 435-37; Olson, Governmental Immunityfrom Tort
Liabili--Two Decades ofDecline: 1959-1979, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 485 (1979).
8. See infra notes 35-68 and accompanying text.
9. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (state board); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978)
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ments,' 0 and private parties" to antitrust review. In Boulder, the
Court refused to give home rule cities the same status as states.12

Thus, in the antitrust immunity context,
municipalities may now
3
be no different from private parties.'
Consistent with the history and policies of state action immunity, 4 the Supreme Court has accurately identified the federalism
concerns which spawned Parker v. Brown and correctly declined
to equate municipalities with states. This Note defends the imposition of antitrust liability on cities and the Court's refusal to
shape its contours in Boulder. It proposes a reasonableness standard of review, derived from antitrust precedent, whereby local
regulatory abuse can be checked. 5 As post-Boulder lower court
cases indicate, vulnerability to antitrust review will not paralyze
16

local governments.
Nonetheless, withdrawal of antitrust immunity automatically
exposes cities to treble damage liability,' 7 a ramification which
frightens local officials and draws fire from the municipal law
bar.' 8 Although the federal courts have yet to enter an antitrust

damage judgment against a city, 19 most commentators have ob2°
jected to exposing local governments to such crippling liability.
Further, critics have not confined the assault on treble damages to
the municipal context.2 1 This Note submits that the quandary
(same); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state bar); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975) (same).
10. See Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (home rule city); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (Dillon's rule city).
11. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state-regulated private
utility). Following the Supreme Court's lead in Bates, most commentators have categorized
the Parker cases as involving either "public" or "private" defendants. See Bates, 433 U.S.
at 361 (distinguishing Cantor as involving private parties). For a discussion of the public/private distinction, see infra notes 200-12 and accompanying text. One view places
Cantor in a class by itself, while another holds that Goldfarb, Cantor, Fox, andMidcal are
all private-party cases. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-126 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 168-93 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
17. Once the immunity cloak is removed, the defendant is exposed to the antitrust
laws, including § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982): "[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue.., and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
18. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 139.
20. See infra note 196.
21. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
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over municipal antitrust liability is a sure indication of underlying
dissatisfaction with treble damages in general.2 2 Therefore, this
Note recommends against judicial obviation of the remedy problem by ensuring broad immunity for local entities, or congressional exemption of cities from treble damage liability. Rather,
this Note proposes that Congress abolish trebling altogether.2 3
Cities, like private parties, should be required to obey the antitrust
laws and respond in damages. But no defendant should be saddled with paying windfall damage awards, including attorney's
fees, to private plaintiffs.
I. BOULDER IN CONTEXT
In 1979, Boulder, Colorado passed an ordinance imposing a
three-month freeze on cable television expansion within its
boundaries.2 4 The result was an antitrust suit against the city.
The holder of a twenty-year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to
provide the city with cable claimed that enforcement of the ordi25
nance would violate the Sherman Act and should be enjoined.
The city argued that its home rule status equated its action
with that of the sovereign State of Colorado and that it therefore
enjoyed immunity under the Parker v. Brown doctrine. Alternatively, the city urged that the home rule provision of the Colorado
Constitution enabled, authorized, and thereby immunized the
city's action. 26 The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. 27
An appreciation of the issues raised, the Court's resolution, and
the debates which followed requires an initial consideration of
Boulder in context.
A. Background- From Parker to Midcal
From the birth of the state action doctrine 28 in Parker v.
Brown until 1975, municipal immunity from antitrust attack was
22. See infra notes 200-12 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 220-33 and accompanying text.

24. 455 U.S. at 45-46.
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 53, 56.
28. The Supreme Court interchanges the terms "state action exemption," "Parker
state action exemption," "Parkerdoctrine," and "state action doctrine" in treating the antitrust immunity of states and their agents and instrumentalities. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S.
at 40, 43, 47, 53, 62. Because the term "exemption" has been labeled inaccurate, id. at 62
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); infra note 98, this Note employs the term "immunity."
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tacitly surmised.2 9 In Parker, the Court had refused to enjoin
state administrators from enforcing a New-Deal-styled marketing
program for California's raisin crop which, the Court assumed,
would have violated the Sherman Act had it been "organized and
made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate. ' 30 Finding no
indication in the Sherman Act or its history that Congress intended to restrain action which "derived its authority and efficacy
from the legislative command of the state,"'" the Court upheld the
California program in a brief, much-quoted opinion by Chief Justice Stone.
1. Parker Federalism and the Sherman Act
The lynchpin of the Parker opinion is federalism. The Court
assumed that Congress under its commerce power could have
"preempted the field," thereby prohibiting the states from engaging in market regulation.3 2 Congress had not done so, nor had it
addressed state action in the floor debates or in the Sherman Act
itself, which Chief Justice Stone construed in light of federalism
principles: "In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress."33 Congressional indirection,
according to Justice Stone, placed federalism constraints on the
Supreme Court, requiring it to conclude that the Sherman Act
"must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state
action."3 4
2.

The Parker DoctrineArises in the Seventies
Between 1943 and 1975, the Supreme Court barely acknowl-

29. See FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 484; Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the
"State-Municipal.4ction" 4ntitrust Cases, 61 TEx. L. REv. 481, 481-82 (1982); Howard,
The Perspective of a Defendant'sLawyer, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 34 (J.
Siena ed. 1982); Comment, Alternative Approaches to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 11
FORDHAm URB. L.J. 51, 51 & n.4 (1982);see also Note, The.4ntitrustLiability ofMunic#palities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368, 379-81 & n.68 (1977) (assumed extension of Parker to municipalities resulted in dearth of precedent for 30 years).
30. 317 U.S. at 344, 350.
31. Id. at 350-51.
32. Id. at 350
33. Id. at 351.
34. Id. at 352.
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edged the Parker doctrine's existence.3 5 Then, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court read Parker as limiting the scope of
immunity to conduct required by state command.36 The Court
found no such mandate to the state bar, whose fee schedule, it
held, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 7
Goldfarb marked the beginning of the Court's commitment to
addressing and defining Parker's state action concept. 38 The following year, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., the Court refused to
immunize a regulated private utility which had allegedly tied
the

sale of lightbulbs to electric service according to a program approved by the state commission.3 9 Quoting Goldfarb, the Court

emphasized that state compulsion was the essential immunity ingredient
and that the state had not compelled the unlawful tiein.40

In 1977, the Court subtly recast the compulsion requirement in
terms of state supervision and articulated policy. 4 ' Distinguishing

Cantor as involving private parties,42 the Bates v. State Bar Court
stressed that the Arizona Supreme Court continuously supervised
the challenged ban on attorney advertising and was the "real
party in interest." 43 Moreover, the state bar had imposed the re-

straint via disciplinary rules reflecting "a clear articulation of the
35. Comment, State Action Immunity and the Compulsion Requirement: Joint
Ratemakingin IntrastateTrucking, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1557, 1560 (1983); see also Note, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: The Emasculationof MunicipalImmunity
from Sherman Act Liabiliy, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 413, 419 & n.51 (1983) (vagueness of
Parker'sstate action definition led to split in courts which Supreme Court ignored for over
30 years).
36. 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
37. Id. at 788, 791.
38. For a thorough review of the recent line of authority Goldfarb initiated, see Richards,Exploringthe FarReaches of the StateAction Exemption: ImplicationsforFederalism,
57 ST. JoHN's L. RPv. 274, 280-309 (1983).
39. 428 U.S. 579, 581 (1976).
40. Id. at 592-93 n.28.
41. In Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977), the Court had "deem[ed] it significant that the state policy [was] so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's
supervision [was] so active." The Court later summarized Bates:
In holding the antitrust laws inapplicable, Bates noted that "[t]hat court [the
Arizona Supreme Court] is the ultimate body wielding the State's power. . . and,
thus, the restraint is 'compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign."'
,. . We emphasized, moreover, the significance to our conclusion... that the
state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint as part of a comprehensive
regulatory system, was one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy,.. . actively supervised by the State Supreme Court as the policymaker.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 360) (citations omitted).
42. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62.
43. Id. at 361.
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State's policy with regard to professional behavior." 44 The Court
concluded that Parker v. Brown barred the Sherman Act claim.4 5
The Bates Court's emphasis on state supervision and articulated
policy formed the basis for subsequent Parker interpretations.

In 1978, the Supreme Court confronted two municipalities
claiming blanket antitrust immunity solely because of their status

"as cities and subdivisions of the State of Louisiana."46 It should

have surprised no one that the Court rejected the cities' expansive
reading of Parker.4 7 Yet, many were surprised.4 8 City ofLafayette
49
v. LouisianaPower & Light Co. produced a rash of conferences
and a spate of commentary 50 which criticized, reformulated, and

generally attempted to make sense out of five opinions from a
sharply divided Court.
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, flatly rejected the notion that cities are themselves sovereign, concluding that neither
Parkernor analogous case law required giving cities the deference
due states.5 1 In denying blanket immunity to cities, Justice Brennan explained that "serious economic dislocation. . . could result
if cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the
Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws."'52 Nevertheless, the plurality did not abolish municipal antitrust immunity53 but instead allowed cities to invoke Parker'sprotection by
44. Id. at 362.
45. Id. at 363.
46. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392, 408 (defendant power company counterclaimed for
various antitrust violations cities allegedly committed in operating municipally owned
power plants).
47. See Troy, Competition and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 136
(J. Siena ed. 1982).
48. See Rose, An Overview: Municpal Antitrust Liability, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 245,
245-46.
49. See id. at 248 & nn.13-14.
50. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 6; Bangasser, Exposure of Municpal Corporationsto
Liability/or Violations ofthe Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity After the City of Lafayette
Decision, 11 URB. LAW. vii (1979); Curtin,Antitrust Comes to the Cities-Analysis of City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. and Its Effect on MunicipalAntitrust Liability,
5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 7 (1980); Taurman, Reflections on City of Lafayette: Applying the
Antitrust "StateAction" Exemption to Local Governments, 13 URB. LAW. 159 (1981); Note,
The Application ofthe AntitrustLaws to MunicipalActivities,79 COLUM. L. REV. 518 (1979).
51. 435 U.S. at 412.
52. Id. at 412-13.
53. The four-Justice plurality declined to immunize cities "in the absence of evidence
that the State authorized or directed a given municipality to act as it did." Id. at 414. The
plurality elaborated:
[A] subordinate governmental unit's claim to Parker immunity is not as readily
established as the same claim by a state government ....
[4In adequate state
mandatefor anticompetitiveactivities of cities ... exists when it isfound "from the
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showing that their "anticompetitive conduct [was] engaged in...
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or
monopoly public service."'5 4 Justice Brennan emphasized that

Goldfarb and Bates required a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy, "actively supervised" by the state as
sovereign. 5
Casting the swing vote, Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
judgment on the ground that the challenged conduct involved a
"proprietary" and not a "governmental" function. 6 Justice Stewart attacked this distinction in dissent. Insisting that Congress
never intended to subject "governmental actions" to the Sherman
Act, he deemed the proper distinction to be between government
and private parties. 7 Furthermore, he prophesied that subjecting
cities to the antitrust laws would "impair the ability of a State to
delegate," "cause excessive judicial interference" with state decisionmaking, and "impose staggering costs on. . .municipal governments. '58 The fragmented Lafayette Court was unable to
provide adequate guidance to lower courts, which expressed difficulty in applying the decision. 9 Thus, many of the same concerns
resurfaced four years later in Boulder.
authoritygiven a governmentalentity to operate in aparticulararea,that the legislature contemplatedthe kind of action complained of."
ld.at 415 (quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added).
The italicized language was later read into Boulder by lower courts. See infra notes 77-81
and accompanying text.
54. 435 U.S. at 413.
55. Id. at 410; see supra note 41.
56. 435 U.S. at 422-24; see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
57. 435 U.S. at 428-30. Justice Stewart, joined by three of his brethren, argued further
that the state compulsion requirement is appropriate only when "private persons claim that
their anticompetitive actions are not their own but the State's." Id. at 431-32. Were the
Court to adopt the governmental/proprietary distinction rather than the public/private distinction, he argued that it would become trapped in the "'quagmire'. . . [of a distinction]
'so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation.'" Id. at 433 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,
65-68 (1955) (tort immunity)); see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1059, 1140 n.359 (1980).
58. 435 U.S. at 438, 440. Justice Blackmun, who joined allbut Part I-B of the Stewart dissent (excessive judicial interference), ified his own dissent attacking the Court for
making "governmental units potentially liable for massive treble damages." Id. at 442-43.
59. E.g., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195 (6th Cir. 1981)
(construing Ohio Constitution as immunizing city from antitrust challenge to its waste disposal landfill operation), vacated and remandedinlight ofBoulder, 455 U.S. 931 (1982): "It
is difficult for us to apply the Lafayette decision since the plurality and dissenting opinions
are each supported by four justices, and no line of reasoning commands a majority of the
Court." For the lineup of the Lafayette Court, see infra note 65.
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The Midcal Test

In the interim between Lafayette and Boulder, the Supreme
Court twice applied the Parker doctrine to private parties claiming that their anticompetitive conduct was protected state action.
In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., the Court deflected an antitrust assault on a California statute.60 The statute's
imposition of a system of restraints on auto dealership franchises
was permissible because, according to the Court, the state board
actively reviewed individual cases and operated according to a
clear state policy to displace competition.6 '
Two years later, in CaliforniaRetailLiquor DealersAssociation
v. MidcalAluminum, Inc., a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed a
state court order enjoining enforcement of a state statute endorsing resale price restrictions on wine.6 2 The restrictions, established by an association of private producers and wholesalers,
were state-authorized and enforced by a state agency. Nevertheless, since the state itself neither set nor reviewed the prices, the
Court refused to allow "[tihe national policy in favor of competition [to] be thwarted by casting . . . a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement. 63 Quoting the Lafayette plurality, Justice Powell
introduced the two-part Midcal test for Parker immunity: "First,
the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second the policy must be
'actively supervised' by the State itself."'
In Fox and, particularly, in Midcal, the Court refined the analytical framework of the Lafayette plurality and synthesized prior
decisions into a single test. This helped the Justices to consolidate
their positions on municipal antitrust immunity.6 5 In 1982, in a
60. 439 U.S. 96, 110 (1978). The statute gave the board authority to delay or deny
franchisors permission to relocate dealerships, and gave competing franchisees the right to
a board hearing upon filing notice of protest. Id. at 104.
61. Id. at 110. The Court held that "[p]rotesting dealers who invoke in good faith
their statutory right to. . .a Board determination. . . do not violate the Sherman Act."
Id. The Fox Court consisted of a six-member majority, two concurring Justices, and a
dissenter.
62. 445 U.S. 97, 100-02 (1980).
63. Id. at 106.
64. Id. at 105 (quoting 435 U.S. at 410). Although the first requirement was satisfied,
the Court held that the second was not. Id. at 105-06.
65. CompareLafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (Justice Brennan's opinion for Court (Part
I) was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and Marshall (who
separately concurred); Parts II and III (legal analysis) were joined by Justices Powell, Stevens, and Marshall; Chief Justice Burger concurred in judgment; Justice Stewart's dissent
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five-to-three decision, the Court held that Parkerv. Brown did not
shield Boulder, Colorado from a Sherman Act challenge to its
cable television moratorium ordinance. The city failed to satisfy
the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" requirement
of Midcal.6 6 Antitrust immunity, which local governments en-

joyed by default for over thirty years, was thus cut back. Availability of the Parker shield currently hinges on a city's ability to
demonstrate that it is acting as or for the state 7-- to do so the city

must satisfy at least the first prong of the Midcal test.68
B.

Boulder Clarjlcationand Confusion

The Court settled two issues in Boulder. First, it dismissed in
footnotes the city's contention, based on the Chief Justice's Lafayette concurrence, that it was immune because cable television reg-

ulation is a governmental, not a proprietary activity.6 9 By failing

was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun (who joined in all but Part II-B
and filed separate dissent)), with Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (Justice Brennan's opinion for
Court was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens (who separately
concurred); Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, Justice White took no part). See Richards, supra note 38, at 296-300 (interpreting Fox and Midcal as indicating that consensus returned to Court after Lafayette).
66. 455 U.S. at 51.
67. Just how a city proves this remains unanswered after Boulder. Sullivan, Antitrust
Laws and the Evolution of the State Action Doctrine, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 17 (J. Siena ed. 1982). According to Professor Sullivan, "City of Boulder tells us
nothing ... about how the standards that thus far have been developed for state action are
to apply to municipalities."
68. 455 U.S. at 51-52 n.14 (declining to decide whether active state supervision requirement applies to cities). The Supreme Court will address the Midcal test again in
Hoover v. Ronwin, which was argued before it on January 16, 1984. See Arguments Before
the Court-Attorneys-Antitrust liability of bar examiners, 52 U.S.L.W. 3559, 3559-60
(1984) (editorial summary of argument). In Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983), plaintiff alleged
that the Arizona State Bar used its examination procedures to restrict bar admissions to a
predetermined quota. The Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing his claim against the
state supreme court's examination committee for violating the Sherman Act in conducting
and grading the 1974 examination (which plaintiff failed). Id. at 694-95.
Before the Supreme Court, the committee members argued that they were immune,
having engaged in state action either as sovereign, as a state subdivision, or as "exempt
private parties." Plaintiff's key argument against immunity was inadequate state supervision. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3559. Justice White, who did not participate in the Boulder decision,
"suggested that state passivity. . . [is] present in this case in view of the broad discretion
given to the committee." Id. His comments indicate that as many as six Justices might
conclude that the committee receives insufficient state supervision to merit antitrust immunity. Since Ronwin does not involve cities, it may not shed much light on applying the
Midcal requirements to local municipal governments, as the Court has implied that "the
fact that the governmental bodies sued are cities. . . has significance." Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 414 (in context of need for state authorization or direction).
69. 455 U.S. at 49 & n.13 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422, 424 (Burger, C.J., con-
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to adopt the governmental/proprietary test, the Boulder Court im-

plicitly confirmed that the nature of a municipality's authority,
not the nature of its activity, is the crucial inquiry.7 °
Second, the Court decided a threshold question unanswered
by Lafayette' '-whether home rule status or powers7 2 conferred
curring)), 55 & n.18; see Areeda, supra note 6, at 443 (distinction unworkable in other
areas).

70. See 455 U.S. at 49 & n.13 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422, 424 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)), 55 & n.18.
71. The municipalities in Lafayette were "Dillon's rule" cities, defined by Justice
Stewart in his dissent in that case as "'instrumentalities of the State for the convenient
administration of goverment within their limits.' They have only such powers as are delegated them by the State.
...435 U.S. at 429 (quoting Louisiana ex rel Folsom v.
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883)) (citation omitted). The majority of
American cities, however, enjoy varying degrees of home rule autonomy, which may have
accounted for the failure of courts, municipal lawyers, and commentators to recognize Lafayette as sounding the death knell for blanket municipal antitrust immunity. See, e.g.,
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981) (city immune by
virtue of home rule authorization), vacated and remanded in light of Boulder, 455 U.S. 931
(1982); Areeda, supra note 6, at 448-49; Freilich & Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to the Dark Ages Before Home Rule, 14 URB. LAW. v, v-vi (1982).
Some disagreement surrounds the extent of the home rule movement. FEDERAL SYSTEM,
supra note 5, at 103 ("Although some forty states by now have constitutional home rule
provisions, one study indicated that home rule powers were vigorously exercised only in
about a dozen states.") (citing Vanlandingham, ConstitutionalMunicipal Home Rule Since
the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1975)); see also Note, Home Rule and
the ShermanAct After Boulder: CitiesBetween a Rock anda HardPlace,49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 259, 262-63 n.24 (1983) (listing constitutional provisions state by state).
72. Home rule generally involves a "grant of power to a local government to frame
and adopt a charter of government, although occasionally it is employed also to refer to a
direct constitutional grant of legislative power." F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 302 (1970). The authors point out that home rule
powers are vaguely defined by constitutions and statutes, id. at 308, giving municipalities
the initiative to act in local matters subject to judicial determination of whether the city has
exceeded the bounds of its initiative. Id. at 309-10.
In constitutional home rule states, home rule also serves as a limitation on the state
legislature's power to interfere in "purely local" affairs. Colorado is one of a few states
whose constitutions expressly provide for this limitation. Id. at 349-50. The balance of
state and local powers is often depicted schematically:
The courts have, in effect, divided legislative power into three "areas." First,
an area in which local governments may legislate only if power has been delegated by the legislature, often termed the area of "exclusively state-wide concern." Second, an area of "purely local concern" in which the legislature is either
forbidden to act or [as in Colorado] in which local law prevails over inconsistent
state law .... Third, an area of so-called "mixed state and local concerns" in
which both local and state governments are competent to legislate but in which
local law is superseded by inconsistent state legislation.
Id. at 352; see also FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 101-05; Cirace, supra note 29, at 490
& n.51; Note, supra note 71, at 261-65.
In Boulder, the city argued that cable television regulation was a purely local concern, a
stance which the Supreme Court rejected by assuming that the district court had correctly
determined that the matter embraced" 'wider concerns, including interstate commerce...
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blanket antitrust immunity on cities. The Court quickly dismissed
the status argument, reiterating its Lafayette premise that cities
are not themselves sovereign. It concluded that the home rule
amendment to the Colorado Constitution had not imbued Colorado's cities with state sovereignty and its accompanying Parker
immunity. 7 The Court then focused on the powers issue:
whether the broad, unspecified grant of home rule powers re-

flected a "clear articulation and affirmative expression" of state
policy to displace competition in cable television.74 The Court an-

swered in the negative, concluding that the first prong of Mideal's
test "is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality respecting
the municipal actions challenged as
'7
anticompetitive. 1
1. The Persistent "Contemplation" Test of Lafayette
Nonetheless, the Boulder decision raised as many questions as
it answered about application of the Midcal formula to cities.7 6
[and] the First Amendment rights of communicators."' 455 U.S. at 43, 47 (quoting 485 F.
Supp. 1035, 1038-39 (D. Colo. 1980)).
73. 455 U.S. at 52-54.
74. Id. at 54-55.
75. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan wrote for the Court: "Acceptance of such a proposition-that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily
implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances-would wholly
eviscerate the concepts of'clear articulation and affirmative expression' that our precedents
require." Id. at 56.
76. Besides disagreeing over the mechanics of applying Midcal, courts are split over
whether the Midcal test is a further specification of the compulsion requirement of Goldfarb and Cantor. See Areeda, supra note 6, at 438 & n.19. Those which use the compulsion label apply Midcal's standards strictly; those which reject it apply the standards
liberally. Compare United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 702 F.2d 532 (5th
Cir. 1983) (compulsion required for private carriers; no immunity), and Ronwin v. State
Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981) (compulsion required for governmental entities; no immunity), cert. grantedsub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983), with First Am.
Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983) (compulsion not
required for state agencies or subdivisions; immunity), and Gold Cross Ambulance v. City
of Kan. City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1012 n.ll (8th Cir. 1983) (dismissing compulsion in footnote;

immunity).
Courts have not applied the compulsion standard to municipal defendants. Southern
Motor Carriers,702 F.2d at 537 (dictum); eg., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.
1983); Gold CrossrAmbulance,705 F.2d at 1012 n.ll; Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
700 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1983); see Areeda, supra note 6, at 445 & nn.49-50 (compulsion
not required of governmental defendants); Comment, supra note 35, at 1561-62:
[I]t appears that the Court developed the Midcal standards for use with public
defendants such as ... [a] city government. . . . At the same time, the Court
contemplated that private defendants such as the bar association in Goldfarb, and
the trucking industry. . . should satisfy the compulsion requirement as well as
the Midcal standards ....
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As to the first prong, precisely what constitutes "clear articulation
and affirmative expression" remains obscured. One cause for con-

fusion is the Boulder Court's passing reference to a passage from
Lafayette. Stressing that immunity requires more than state neutrality, Justice Brennan had added: "A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have
'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought." 77
Lower courts have thus interpreted Boulder as incorporating
Lafayette's "contemplation" standard with all its baggage.78
Some courts have seized upon Lafayette's language and Professor
Phillip Areeda's analysis79 to find a "clear articulation and affirmative expression" by implication.8" Despite the Boulder Court's
refusal to permit the requisite legislative intent to be "inferred,
'from the authority given' to Boulder 'to operate in a particular
area,' "81 courts have immunized parties whose anticompetitive
conduct is shown to have been "contemplated" by a state legislature as a "reasonable or foreseeable consequence" of engaging in
statutorily authorized activity. 82 Reading the contemplation stan-

dard into Boulder has permitted extremely loose interpretations of
"clear articulation and affirmative expression,"8 3 which seem to
77. 455 U.S. at 55.
78. Eg., City of N. Olmstead v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 722 F.2d
1284, 1288 (6th Cir. 1983); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d at 663; Central Iowa Refuse Sys. v.
Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1983); Gold Cross
Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1012-13; Town ofHallie, 700 F.2d at 381; see Civiletti, The Fallout
from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Frospectusfora Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 379, 384 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 268, 270-71 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Term]. But see Comment, supra note 29,
at 62 (Boulder Court abandoned contemplation standard).
79. 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976) ("This
does not mean ... that a political subdivision necessarily must. . . point to a specific,
detailed, legislative authorization. . . . [A]n adequate state mandate.

. . exists when it is

found 'from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that
the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' "); see Areeda, supra note 6,
at 455-46.
80. CentralIowa, 715 F.2d at 426-427; FirstAmerican Title, 714 F.2d at 1454-55; Gold
CrossAmbulance, 705 F.2d at 1012-13; Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 381; Benson v. Arizona
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 276 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982).
81. 455 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 394).
82. See cases cited supra note 78.
83. In CentralIowa, for example, a sanitary landfill operator sued the metropolitan
waste agency, 15 municipalities, and a county for Sherman Act violations arising out of the
agency's requirement that (as long as revenue bonds were outstanding) all solid waste generated in its geographic area be disposed of at its facility. Plaintiff argued that the authorizing state statutes were to ensure the project's financial success and thus the agency's
restraint was not contemplated. The court responded "that notwithstanding the statutes'
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belie the very words the Supreme Court uses to label this
silence on the specific matter of monopolization, it is possible to infer the existence of an
affirmative state policy permitting anticompetitive practices in the operation of municipal
landfills." 715 F.2d at 426.
To plaintiff's contention that" 'a State that allows its municipalities to do as they please
can hardly be said to have "contemplated" the specific anticompetitive actions,' "id. (quoting Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55), the court responded that "although the State has left Iowa
municipalities with a range of options. . . by no means has [it] adopted an approach of
indifference or 'mere neutrality.'" 715 F.2d at 427. To conclude that the Iowa legislature
contemplated the restrictions was not an "unwarranted leap." Rather,
[w]hen ascertaining what was in the minds of the legislators, we cannot ignore the
Common sense
realities of the municipal bond market in the mid 1970's. ...
and experience suggest that the Iowa legislature must have intended Metro to
have the latitude necessary to impose restrictions on competition if Metro believed such restrictions necessary to promote the sale of the bonds. . . .Thus, we
believe that the restraint on competition was a "necessary or reasonable consequence" of engaging in the authorized activity ....
Id. (quoting Gold CrossAmbulance, 705 F.2d at 1013).
In Town of Hallie, plaintiff towns alleged that the city's conditioning of sewage treatment services on annexation was a means of leveraging its monopoly power over sewage
treatment to monopolize sewage collection and transportation. 700 F.2d at 378. The court
relied upon two state statutes. One authorized the city to decide where to extend its sewage
treatment service. The other permitted "the department of natural resources [to] order a
city to extend its sewerage system to a town, but if that town then refused to become annexed ... the order [would become] void." Id. at 382. The court held that Boulder's
"clear articulation and affirmative expression" requirement had been met, id. at 383, and
relied on Lafayette "contemplation":
[I1f we can determine that the state gave the City authority to operate in the area
of sewage services and to refuse to provide treatment services, then we can assume
that the State contemplated. . . the anticompetitive effect that is a reasonable or
foreseeable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity.
Id. at 381.
At least one court, while accepting the "contemplation" standard, has demanded more
than the "reasonable consequence" inference. In Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.
1983), the city of Klamath Falls, Oregon had conditioned permission to vacate platted
streets on plaintiff developer's relinquishment of its constitutional right to just compensation for its geothermal wells. The city denied permission when plaintiff refused to dedicate
the land containing the wells. The court declined to shield the city from plaintiffs Sherman Act suit:
From our reading of the statute, it is questionable whether the legislature intended to create such monopolistic control. ... However, even assuming that
such a monopoly proviso is implicitly authorized and can be said to be "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," . . . merely demonstrating a state policy to displace competition with monopoly public service does not
necessarily satisfy the additional requirement that the legislature contemplated
the kind of action complained of. . . .As the plurality stated in Lafayette, "even
a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust restraints when it seeks to extend
or exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its authorization." . . .
There is nothing in [the statute] which would allow us to infer that any authorization by the state to displace competition with city-run geothermal districts also
includes authorization for a city to undertake anticompetitive actions in its efforts
to establish such a district.
Id. at 663-64 (citations omitted).
Other courts have ignored the contemplation language altogether, focusing instead on
whether the state has compelled the anticompetitive activities. See United States v. South-
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requirement.84
2. Prognosisfor "Active Supervision" and Cities

Broadbased immunity was also facilitated by the Boulder
Court's failure to apply Midcal's second prong-the "active supervision" requirement. Reading the test in the conjunctive, the
Court did not reach the second question because Boulder's ordinance had not survived the first.8 ' Thus, debate continues among
the circuit courts and the commentators over active supervision. 6
A close reading of Boulder suggests that the Court eventually
will apply this requirement to cities, and circuit court cases indicate that it will be interpreted liberally. Even as the Boulder
Court leaned heavily on the Lafayette plurality, it relied equally
on more recent precedent where the test was set forth and both
prongs applied 87 -in Fox and Midcal, presence or absence of state
supervision had been determinative.88 This, coupled with the
Court's failure to distinguish the "public" City of Boulder from
the "private" parties claiming immunity in Midal,89 has conern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 702 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1983) (Midcal required compulsion; Lafayette and Boulder distinguished as involving municipal activities); Ronwin, 686
F.2d at 696 (record insufficient to determine whether state supreme court had subjective
knowledge of bar grading procedures; delegation of powers to court-selected committee,
without more, does not satisfy Midcal's two-part test for compulsion); supra note 76.
84. Justice Stewart identified the fundamental weakness of the contemplation test in
his Lafayette dissent:
[SItate statutes often are enacted with little recorded legislative history, and the
bare words of a statute will often be unilluminating in interpreting legislative
intent. For example, do the Louisiana statutes permitting the petitioners to operate public utilities "contemplate" that the petitioners might tie the sale of gas to
the sale of electricity? Do those statutes, indeed, "contemplate" that electric service will be provided to city residents on a monopoly basis? Without legislative
history or relevant statutory language, any answer to these questions would be
purely a creation of judicial imagination.
435 U.S. at 437.
85. 455 U.S. at 51-52 & n.14; see Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 696 ("failure to meet either
requirement precludes application of. . .antitrust immunity").
86. See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Richards, supra
note 38, at 309-13; Susman & White, supra note 5, at 24; Note, supra note 71, at 287-88;
Comment, supra note 29, at 52 & n.6, 62-63; f. Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677
F.2d 992, 994-96 (3d Cir. 1982) (active supervision satisfied by state commission's oversight
of fees, since state supreme court had upheld fee setting as within legislative intent); Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1982) (supervision by board satisfied Midcal requirement).
87. 455 U.S. at 51-52 & n.14, 54 (stressing Fox and Mideal; ignoring Goldfarb and
Cantor).
88. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
89. See 455 U.S. at 56 ("[The antitrust] laws, like other federal laws imposing civil or
criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to municipalities as well as to other
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vinced some writers that both parts of the Midcal formulation
should apply to municipal defendants. 90

Most courts ruling on the applicability of state supervision to
municipal defendants have derived a public/private distinction
from the entire line of state action cases. Under this view, cities

are classified as public for purposes of the active supervision requirement, Midcal is distinguished on its facts as involving private
parties, 9 ' and immunity is preserved. The courts typically support

this outcome with policy: State delegation would be frustrated by
federal intrusion; cities, themselves governments, do not need
forced to sacrifice power and
state oversight; cities should not be
92

autonomy for antitrust immunity.

While identifying defendants as public was crucial to the result
in Parkerv. Brown,93 these courts have drawn the public/private
line too close to the local end of the spectrum. For, as Justice
Brennan stressed in Lafayette and again in Boulder, Parker's
corporate entities."); Slater, Local Governments and State Action Immunity After City of
Lafayette and City of Boulder, 51 ANTrrRusT L.J. 349, 358 (1982); Sullivan, supra note 67,
at 17; cf.Cirace, supra note 29, at 489 (although Court has not said so expressly, Boulder
holding and Lafayette dictum suggest possibility that "municipalities are no more entitled
to special consideration under the antitrust laws than are private parties"). The Boulder

dissent also read the majority as having equated cities with private parties for antitrust
immunity purposes. 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Howard, supra note 29, at 36; Susman & White, supra note 5, at 24; Comment,
supra note 29, at 52 & n.6, 62-63.
91. Gold CrossAmbulance, 705 F.2d at 1014 (Midcal,Cantor, and Goldfarb involved

private parties and were distinguishable; city immune); Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 383
(same); see Note, supra note 71, at 287-88; cf. Richards, supra note 38, at 309 ("willingness
to distinguish between public and private defendants has allowed a broader range of
Parker immunity for the public defendant"). But cf Comment, supra note 35, at 1561
(Midcal defendant waspublic;Midcal standards apply to public defendants such as cities).
92. Eg., Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1014-15 ("Because municipal officials
generally are politically accountable to the citizens they represent. . ., state supervision is
not as necessary to prevent abuse as in the private context"; state supervision could result in
duplicative, wasteful regulation and erode local autonomy); see Cirace, supra note 29, at
490 ("Court's current test may restrict excessively the ability of states to delegate power to
localities"); 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 272 (loss of municipal power has resulted from
Boulder). See generally Freilich, Donovan & Rolls, Antitrust Liability andPreemptionAuthoriy: Trends and Developments in Urban, State and Local Government Law, 15 URB.

LAW. 705, 707-37 (1983) (cataloging cases).
93. The Parker Court found no "purpose

. .

. to restrain a state or its officers or

agents," 317 U.S. at 350, or "to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents," id at
351; it distinguished between "private persons, individual or corporate" and states, concluding that the Sherman Act prohibited "individual and not state action." Id at 352; see
Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust
Context: Parker v. Brown in a ConstitutionalPerspective, 1978 DuKE L.J. 389, 414-16; cf.

Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Parker's principle is government/private persons distinction); infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:303

linedrawing was based onfederalism- accommodating state and
national powers. In this balance, cities have no place.9 4 Rather,
the Brennan opinions suggest that subordinate governmental units

do not warrant immunity from the Sherman Act, a paramount
federal law, unless the state considers their activities important
enough to be affirmatively addressed and overseen.
II.

IN DEFENSE OF BOULDER

Among commentators and the municipal bar, the doctrinal issues answered and unanswered in Boulder may have been
eclipsed by issues not even before the Court-preemption, liability, and remedy. Like Lafayette, the Boulder decision provoked
criticism and dire predictions. They focus on a perceived distortion of federalism principles9 5 and bring out a parade of horribles:
unrestrained review of city conduct by federal antitrust courts,
state usurpation of municipal prerogatives of self-government,
and cities crippled and bankrupted by an outpouring of private
suits and treble damage judgments.9 6
A. The Issue Before the Court: Sovereign Immunity
Opponents of municpal antitrust liability have assailed the La-

fayette-Boulder premise that local governments do not command
the same federal deference as states.9 7 The Boulder dissenters, for
example, identified one context where state and local action is not
94. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13); Richards,
supra note 38, at 312-13; ef. Cirace, supra note 29, at 486-87 (majority of Supreme Court
defined state action in terms of sovereign immunity; this principle "tends to exclude municipalities by definition, because they do not possess the attribute of sovereignty").
95. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 61-64, 69-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cirace, supra note
29, at 488; Civiletti, The Boulder and Lafayette Decisions: Antitrust orAnti- Cities?, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 181 (J. Siena ed. 1982); Note, supra note 35, at 429.
96. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60, 65-68, 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Local Government Antitrust Liability: HearingsBefore the Senate JudiciaryComm, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (summarized in Cities Seek Antitrust Exemption in Response to Boulder Decision,
[1982 File Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 12-13 (July 1,
1982)); Cirace, supra note 29; Civiletti, supra note 78; Freilich & Carlisle, supra note 71;
Spiegel, supra note 7; Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration'sPosition on
Antitrust Liability of Municipalities, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 371 (1982); Note, supra note 71;
Note, supra note 35; Comment, supra note 29; Note, The PreemptionAlternative to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 145 (1982); 1981 Term, supra note 78, at
268-78; Comment, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Denialof Parker
Exemption to Home Rule Cities, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 139; Recent Development, Municivalities and the Antitrust Laws: Home Rule Authority Is Insufficient to Ensure State Action
Immunity, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1041 (1982).
97. See, e.g., Boulder 455 U.S. at 61-64, 69-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Civiletti, supra note 95, at 488; Freilich & Carlisle,
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distinguished-federal preemption-and urged that Parker v.
Brown be read in that vein.98
1. The Preemption Proposal

Forcing Parker into a preemption mold would result in abandonment of the current state action test and preservation of municipal immunity. 99 But federal preemption focuses on the

"collision" of state or local legislation with a federal statute,"°°

supra note 71, at x-xii; Note, supra note 35, at 429; cf. 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 272-74
(advocating federalism defense to protect "traditional" or "core" municipal activities).
98. 455 U.S. at 60-65, 68, 70 (Rehniquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist attacked
the term "exemption" as improper in the Parker context, id at 60-61, arguing a fine doctrinal distinction between "exemption" and "preemption." See Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1378-79 (1978), cited with approvalinBoulder, 455 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Lafayette Court had explained its use of "exemption" as simply
"a shorthand expression" for the Parker doctrine. 435 U.S. at 393 n.8 (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.). Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist used this argument as a basis for rereading
Parker as a preemption case and abolishing the authorization and supervision formula.
455 U.S. at 61.
99. See 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The question addressed in Parker
and in this case is... whether statutes, ordinances, and regulations enacted as an act of
government are pre-empted by the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy
Clause.") (emphasis in original). But see First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title
Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1451-55 (8th Cir. 1983). According to the Eighth Circuit, "[i]t is...
self-evident that application of state action principlesfollowsthe antitrust court's initial determination that there is trul, a conflict between the Sherman Act and the challenged regulatory scheme." Id at 1451-52 (emphasis added). Viewing preemption and state action as
two steps in the immunity inquiry produced an incredible result in First American Title-after a four-day bench trial on the substantive antitrust issues, 541 F. Supp. 1147,
1149 (D.S.D. 1982), the Eighth Circuit relied on defendants' victory in the district court to
hold that the challenged scheme was neither preempted nor reachable under Parker. By
requiring that the preemption question be answered first, the court effectively demanded a
liability trial (to determine existence of "irreconcilable conflict"; i.e., violation) before it
could reach the Parker question!
100. Compare Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51, with Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67
(1941), andid. at 79-80 (Stone, J., dissenting). In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 157-58 (1978), the Court summarized preemption analysis as two-stage. Initially, the
Court must examine congressional intent to determine whether "'Congress left no room
for the States to supplement'" federal regulation. Id. at 157 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The Parker Court did not undertake this analysis, but assumed without deciding that Congress had not done so. 317 U.S. at 350. According to Ray, the second inquiry follows if the first is answered in the negative:
Even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular
area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid
federal statute. A conflict will be found "where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility .... ," or where the state "law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963); Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). The Parker Court avoided this analysis as well. See
infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. For a discussion of preemption, see G. GuN-
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and in Parker this collision was assumed and never analyzed. 10 1
Chief Justice Stone, in a truncated congressional intent inquiry,
never explored whether there was an "irreconcilable conflict"
which would prevent California's raisin market legislation from
coexisting with the Sherman Act.' 2 Rather, he sought to determine whether Congress had intended to restrain state action,"03 a
posture which reflects sovereign immunity concerns.10 4 In that
0 5
context, cities have long been distinguished from states.1
343-45 (10th ed. 1980); see also
Richards, supra note 38, at 305 n. 177; Note, The PreemptionAlternative to MunicipalAntitrust Liability, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 145 (1982); 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 271 & n.25.
101. 317 U.S. at 350 ("We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate
program would violate the Sherman Act ....
).
102. Chief Justice Stone never addressed or considered the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" as reflected in the Sherman Act. Rather, his examination was exceedingly narrow:
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action. . . . The Act is applicable to "persons". . . [and a] state may maintain a suit for damages under it ...
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislaTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

tive history ....

[Ilts purpose was to suppress combinations.

. . by individuals

and corporations ....
317 U.S at 351. The examination was also limited to the Sherman Act. Despite the Court's
characterization of the complaint as "assail[ing] the validity of the program under the antitrust laws," id at 349 (emphasis added), the Court ignored the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1982), the Federal Trade Commission Act, id §§ 41-58, and the Robinson-Patman Act, §§ 13-13b, 2 1a (enacted just six years before Parker, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Star.
1526 (1936)).
The total preoccupation with the state's ability to "control... its officers and agents"
in Parker is illustrated by contrasting its inquiry with those in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 232-38 (1947), and Hines, 312 U.S. at 69-74.
103. 317 U.S. at 351.
104. While sovereign immunity may have derived from Roman law, underlying the
common law "seems to have been the theory, allied with the divine right of kings, that 'the
King can do no wrong,' together with the feeling that it was necessarily a contradiction of
his sovereignty to allow him to be sued.., in his own courts." W. PROSSER,, supra note 7,
at 970. In the United States, this "feudal and monarchistic doctrine" was very early imported into federal, id. at 971 & nn.14-15, as well as state law, id at 975. An abortive
judicial effort to abolish state immunity (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (I Dall.) 419 (1793))
resulted in passage of the 11th amendment. Id at 975 & n.49.
According to Prosser, the following policies underpin state tort immunity: "[Plublic policy; the absurdity of a wrong committed by an entire people"; the theory that the state can
do no wrong; respondeat superior theory (where state is master, servant's torts are outside
scope of employment); "reluctance to divert public funds to compensate for private injuries; and the inconvenience and embarrassment" to government. Id at 975.
As used in this Note, the term "sovereign immunity" refers to the type of federal deference to states required by the 11th amendment to the Constitution. See infra notes 118-20
and accompanying text.
105. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); accord, Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); see infra note 120. One of
preemption's advantages from the Boulder dissenters' viewpoint is its failure to make any
distinction between state and municipal regulation. See 455 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, J.
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Parker's brand of deference is not implicated" °6 when one of

thousands of local subunits, acting in its own parochial inter08
ests,107 violates the broad procompetitive mandate of Congress.1
3 Eleventh Amendment Is the
2. The "BasicallyIrrelevant""
ProperAnalog

Parker v. Brown makes the most sense when read as an eleventh amendment case."10 Its emphasis on the identity of the defendants as state officials'' then becomes understandable: The

public (or sovereign) character of defendants is a paramount concern in eleventh amendment jurisprudence.' 1 2 Moreover, the
dissenting); Richards, supra note 38, at 306-07 & nn.184-87. As noted by Justice Rehnquist, preemption would perpetuate municipal antitrust immunity, id at 68, since it would
preserve the local enactment in most instances. See infra note 123 (discussing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982)). As commentators have observed, however, substituting preemption for the current state action test would subvert federal antitrust goals.
See Lipsky, The Justice Department Looks at Boulder, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 195-96 (J. Siena ed. 1982); 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 272 ("exercise of regulatory
powers by sixty thousand municipalities might lead to 'the strangulation of nationwide
businesses by a maze of conflicting local regulations and the frustration of national political objectives by local selfishness and protectionism.' ") (quoting Frug, supra note 57, at
1067); infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text; Sf Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406-08 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.,) (allowing numerous local subunits immunity would subvert

antitrust goals).
106. See Note, supra note 71, at 282-83:
Although fairly compelling, Justice Rehnquist's analysis ultimately fails. While it
may be true in other contexts that federalism does not distinguish between states
and subdivisions of states, implicit in the federalism operative in Parker is such a
distinction: the Parker principle is based upon the proposition that it is a state's
status as sovereign that warrants the inference of immunity from the Sherman
Act.
Id. at 283. But cf. Cirace, supra note 29, at 488, 497-99 (proposing modified preemption
test).
107. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13, quoted in Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50-51; Cirace,
supra note 29, at 489 (Lafayette "Court recoiled at the prospect of allowing some sixty
thousand units of local government the same freedom to initiate competitive diplacements
that [it allows states].")
108. As Justice Brennan wrote in Boulder, the city's "adverse consequences" argument
was "simply an attack upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional commitment to
the policy of free markets and open competition embodied in the antitrust laws." 455 U.S.
at 56; see also id n.19; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 399-400.
109. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
111. The Parker Court concentrated on party identity, not on the type of activity challenged. It was preoccupied with the state's relationship with its officers and agents, see
supra note 102, and continually referred to "the state"-states,it pointed out, are "sovereign." 317 U.S. at 350-52 (emphasis added); see Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 93, at
416 (Parker'slanguage neatly comports with 11th amendment's focus on party identity;
Parker doctrine and 11th amendment are analogous but not coextensive).
112. Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 93, at 415-16 & n.150.
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unique focus of Chief Justice Stone's intent inquiry reflects eleventh amendment values. Assuming that defendants' conduct violated the Sherman Act, and that Congress could have precluded
all state economic regulation but did not, 1 3 the Parker Court
looked for other evidence of congressional intent to restrain or
hinder states from implementing market controls.1 14 Finding

none, the Court would imply none. 1 5 This analysis compelled
the ruling that defendants were immune; it did not involve a finding of no conflict between the California raisin prorate statute and
the Sherman Act. 16
The Lafayette and Boulder Courts have implicitly recognized
7
the eleventh amendment's relevance to the Parker doctrine."1
113. See supra note 102. The cursory discussion of the Sherman Act and its history in
Parker reveals that the Court's sole concern was with the federalism ramifications of finding an antitrust violation by a state. See 317 U.S. at 350-51 (repeated reference to "violate"). Moreover, the preemption inquiry was quickly glossed over: "Occupation of a
legislative 'field' by Congress in the exercise of a granted power is a familiar example of its
constitutional power to suspend state laws." Id at 350. The Court apparently viewed Congress' failure to "preempt the field" as evidence that Congress never intended to "restrain
state action." See id.
114. Id. at 350-51.
115. Id
116. Compare id (conclusory analysis of legislative intent stressing state sovereignty),
with Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158-78 (1978) (conventional preemption
analysis spanning 21 pages stressing conflict between statutes), and Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1982) ("In determining whether the Sherman Act preempts a state statute, we apply principles similar to those which we employ in considering
whether any state statute is pre-empted by a federal statute pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.").
117. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 (citing 1lth amendment cases to support assertion that
"[c]ities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the
States that create them"), quotedin Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50. While Justice Stewart's Lafayette dissent attacked the plurality for relying "on the basically irrelevant body of law under
the Eleventh Amendment," 435 U.S. at 430-31, even Justice Stewart emphasized that the
key distinction in Parker cases involves theparties (public/private), not the type of activity
(governmental/proprietary). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 93, have made a convincing historical argument that
11th amendment concerns were the major impetus for Parker v. Brown:
Justice Stevens ... suggested that the Court in setting Parker v. Brown for reargument, was concerned about the impact of its contemporaneous decision in
Georgia v. Evans [316 U.S. 159 (1943)], which had held a state to be a "person"
within the Sherman Act and therefore entitled to maintain an action ....
[This]
generated the logical next question-whether a state could in turn be sued and
held liable ....
Id. at 414 (discussing Cantor, 428 U.S. 579 (1976)). The authors continued:
Less than two years prior to . . . Parker, Justice Stone wrote the opinion in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), which sustained the constitutionality
under the commerce clause of... the Fair Labor Standards Act ....
Mhe
Court rejected a challenge bottomed on the tenth amendment . . . . [S]o it is
reasonable to infer that the federalism principles embodied in Parker . . . are
derived from eleventh amendment principles.
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The amendment,' 1 8 which shields states and state officials from
federal court damage suits, 1 9 does not apply to municipal corpo-

rations. 120 A county or other political subdivision may invoke
eleventh amendment protection only by showing that, because of
its close connection with the state, it is acting as "an arm of the
State."' 2 ' The current state action test, with its focus on state policy and state involvement, comports with Parker's implicit elev-

enth amendment foundation. Justice Rehnquist's preemption
alternative, 12 2 on the other hand, not only misunderstands Parker

but also would effectively blanket every city, town, suburb,
county, and special purpose unit with antitrust immunity.123 It
Id. at 416-17 n.156.
118. U.S. CONsr. amend. XI provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." Although on its face the amendment prohibits suits against states by
noncitizens, the Supreme Court has extended its prohibition to suits by citizens against
their own states. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1890); accord, Cate v. Oldham, 707
F.2d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 1983). For historical background, see Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, andRegulation: Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 7,
at 970-92 (governmental immunity, liability of public officers).
119. Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651 (1974); accord, Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d at
1180-81. But see FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 483 (suggesting that Maine v.
Thiboutot, 441 U.S. 1 (1980), effectively overruled Edelman by permitting monetary recovery from state treasury in civil rights suit).
120. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
The Court has explicitly distinguished cities from states in other contexts. See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (vote apportionment; "Political subdivisions of
States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities."); accord, Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1969) (double jeopardy).
121. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
122. See supra note 98.
123. Subsequent to Boulder, the Supreme Court announced its test for antitrust preemption in Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). Writing for a
unamimous Court, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[A] state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be condemned under the
antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes
a violation ofthe antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute.
Such condemnation will follow under § 1 of the Sherman Act when the conduct
contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se violation. If the activity addressed by the statute does not fall into that category, and therefore must be analyzed under the rule of reason, the statute cannot be condemned in the abstract.
Id. (emphasis added). Under the Rice formula, the Sherman Act would preempt state or
local legislation only in the most extreme cases. If this test were substituted for the Parker
doctrine, as Justice Rehnquist urged in his Boulder dissent, state and local regulation
would be nearly impervious to federal antitrust review.
In Rice, Justice Rehnquist may have abandoned his campaign for displacing theParker
doctrine with preemption. He appeared to concede that the Rice preemption analysis is
confined to facial challenges of state and local legislation. Id at 661-62 & n.8. More
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was precisely this potential for unwarranted infringement of federal antitrust goals that led the Boulder Court to extend Lafayette
to all municipalities. 124
Substituting preemption for the Midcal test would compel far
greater federal deference to states than that constitutionally
due.'2 5 Such a result would be paradoxical in the context of the
Sherman Act, a law so fundamental that the Court has extended it
to its constitutional limits.' 26 The special problems and needs of
local government should be addressed at the violation stage, not

categorically declared the basis for sweeping antitrust immunity.
B.

The Issue Not Before the Court. Liability

Boulder's critics have raised a host of objections based on what
they perceive to be the inevitable ramifications of municipal antitrust liability.127 But because the case came to it on the threshold
state action question only, the Court was in no posture to consider
how the antitrust laws should be applied on the merits to "public"
defendants. 2 Nor were other procedural defenses-jurisdiction, 129 standing to sue under the Clayton Act, 13 0 "antitrust insignificantly, he confessed that preemption and Parker immunity are separate questions.
Id. at 662-63 n.9.
124. See supra notes 107-08.
125. Congress could have displaced all anticompetitive state and local economic regulation under its commerce power. Parker, 317 U.S. at 150. Its failure to do so and silence
on the subject in the Sherman Act placed a federalism limit onfederalcourts which resulted
in the Parker doctrine. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. The courts are not
so constrained if municipal and not state action is involved. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
126. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (Sherman
Act reaches to extent of commerce power); see Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp.,
425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976) ("Sherman Act... [expands] along with expanding notions of
congressional power").
127. E.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. 68-70 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); Civiletti, supra note 95, at
182-84; Freilich & Carlisle, supra note 71,passim; Note, supra note 71, at 259-60; Note,
supra note 35,passim. Problems regarding the treble damage remedy are addressed infra
notes 194-233 and accompanying text.
128. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20. In this highly suggestive footnote, the Court intimated that cities may be indistinguishable from private parties for immunity purposes but
distinguishable for liability purposes:
This case's preliminary posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider other issues regarding the applicability of the antitrust laws in the context of suits by
private litigants against government defendants. As we said in City of Lafayette,
"[i]t may be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a
local government."
Id. (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48).
129. Eg., McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241-43 (1980) (Sherman Act jurisdiction requires "substantial effect on interstate commerce"); United States v. American
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jury,"'3 1 the various immunities available to public officials in
other contexts' 32 -before the Court. The lower courts have thus
been enlisted to work out these and other problems as they arise in

litigation.

33

As Justice Stevens reminded the Boulder Court in his concur-

rence, the state action immunity question is absolutely divorced

from the violation issues. 134 The Parker Court itself mandated

this separation by assuming a violation for purposes of its inquiry. 135 Correctly, the Boulder majority remanded, leaving the
district court to proceed as though the Parker question had never
37

been raised.' 36 Unmoved by the dissenters' dire predictions,

Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1975) (Clayton Act applies to firms "engaged in commerce"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 193-201 (1974)
(section 2(a) of Clayton Act, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, requires evidence that
activities are "in commerce"); see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 231-40
(1978). According to one theory, the Court devised the Parker doctrine to counter its significant enlargement of the commerce power, and the corresponding enlargement of federal
jurisdiction, during the 1930's. See Kendrick v. City Council, 516 F. Supp. 1134, 1140
(S.D. Ga. 1981); Note, supra note 35, at 413-14; cf.Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 93, at
414.
130. E , Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (test for injury to "business or property"); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (direct injury
requirement); see Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 659-61 (9th Cir. 1983) (in antitrust suit
against city, plaintiff survived direct injury test but was required to prove injury to business
or property on remand). See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor
Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977) (proposing policy-balancing approach to
achieve more systematic resolution of standing issues).
131. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
132. Most immunity cases have been decided by federal courts in the context of suits
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), for civil rights violations and so-called constitutional or
statutory torts. See, eg., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (cataloging cases). Cities
themselves cannot assert immunity to § 1983 actions, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but their officials may attempt to do so, see Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 237, reh'g en banc granted, 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.
1983) (city mayor unsuccessfully asserted qualified immunity to Sherman Act liability;
court applied objective "good faith" test and rejected claim); cf. Benson v. Arizona State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting 7 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 46.01 (1983) (" 'Good faith actions of state
officials are immune from attack under the antitrust laws if those officials act within the
scope of their authority in the furtherance of a declared governmental policy or legislative
scheme.' ").
133. 455 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 58-60.
135. 317 U.S. at 350.
136. The Boulder dispute was ultimately settled out of court. de Raismes, The Boulder
Case: Caveat Polis, MUN. ATT'Y, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 14, 17-18. Plaintiff cable company
won a "buildout" of the entire city and a minimal, 15-year franchise. Id. at 17.
137. 455 U.S. at 56-57 (rejecting city's "adverse consequence" and "federal court burden" arguments). The dissent predicted that the "Court's decision. . . will. . . impede, if
not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations aimed at pro-
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the majority may have become skeptical13 during the years after
Lafayette- Justices Stewart and Blackmun had voiced similar
fears about the impact of municipal antitrust liability and their
dire predictions had not yet materialized. 1 39 It now appears that
at least five Justices have chosen to subject cities to antitrust "as
is," and are waiting to see how lower courts respond to their im40
plications that special liability rules might be devised.'
1. The Debate
Boulder's unanswered questions regarding substantive antitrust law and cities have coalesced into three main issues. As to
the first, the applicability of per se rules, 14 1 commentators generally urge that government defendants be spared these "judicial
shortcuts." 142 The remaining two issues involve application of the
rule of reason: 143 whether cities may offer health, safety, and weltecting public health, safety, and welfare," id. at 60, urging that "[b]efore this Court leaps
into the abyss and holds that municipalities may violate the Sherman Act ... it ought to
think about the consequences," id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
138. See 455 U.S. at 58 & n.l (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. One commentator has noted that despite dire predictions of a flood of litigation
and bankrupted cities which followed Lafayette, only 30 suits were filed
against cities between 1978 and 1980 and none resulted in a final damage judgment. Spiegel, supra note 7,
at 165; cf.Boulder, 455 U.S. at 58 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring) (making similar observation
about Cantor). The fears voiced regarding Boulder could prove to be overstated as well.
Cf. Note, supra note 71, at 260 n.8 (as of mid-1982, only 43 out of 300 cities surveyed were
defending antitrust suits).
140. See supra note 128.
141. The orthodox definition of per se illegality appears in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[C]ertain agreements or practices. . . because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use." The condemned agreements or practices
include price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), horizontal market division, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), and (to a lesser
degree) tying arrangements, United States Steel v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), and boycotts and concerted
refusals to deal, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). For discussions of per se characterization,
see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1982); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978). Practices not
deemed per se illegal are judged under the rule of reason. See infra note 143.
142. E.g., Spiegel, supra note 7, at 165; Sullivan, supra note 67, at 14; Note, supra note
71, at 296, Note, supra note 50, at 539 nn.158-59; Recent Development, supra note 96, at
1071. Per se rules are shortcut devices because they reduce the costs and complexities of
judging business practices. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.);
United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
143. One classic statement of the rule of reason appears in Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
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fare justifications under existing precedent"4 and, if so, whether
the flexible balancing of conventional rule of reason analysis
1 45
would invite unrestrained review of municipal action.
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, a Fifth Circuit
panel invoked the per se rule forbidding horizontal market divi-

sion against Houston's mayor.

46

Nonetheless, the importance of

the debate over per se condemnation of city conduct has been
somewhat overstated. As the Affiliated court pointed out, only14 a7
limited number of practices have been characterized as such.
Moreover, blind application of established per se rules is waning.148 Were a court categorically to declare a municipal activity

be particularly
unlawful, the violation would almost certainly
14 9
egregious, such as suborning a naked cartel.

Justice Rehnquist's overly strict interpretation of National Solates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This definition is not without its critics, however. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADox 41-47 (1978). Indeed, the content of rule of reason analysis has become a major
battleground for the various "schools" of antitrust policy. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 152-71 (2d ed.
1981).
144. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Civiletti, supra note 78,
at 386-87; Sullivan, supra note 67, at 14-15; Susman & White, supra note 5, at 30; Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalitites Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH.
U.L. REv. 395, 398-99 (1983); Note, supra note 71, at 293; Note, supra note 35, at 432-33;
Comment, supra note 29, at 51, 79-80; 1981 Tenn, supra note 78, at 274-75.
145. See Boulder, 45 U.S. at 65-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Civiletti, supra note 78,
at 387; Williamson, supra note 96, at 377; Note, supra note 71, at 295-96 n.192; Note, supra
note 35, at 433; Comment, supra note 29, Ot 81-82; 1981 Term, supra note 78 at 275; cf.
Areeda, supra note 6, at 445, 453 (making same argument in Lafayette's wake).
146. 700 F.2d 226, 235-38, reh'g en banc granted,714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983). The City
of Houston had been dismissed as a party by stipulation. Id. at 237 n.15.
147. Id. at 236; see supra note 141.
148. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 18-24 (1979) (price fixing);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical location restriction); United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982)
(price fixing); cf. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 342-54 (same); United States v. Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conf. 672 F.2d 469, 479-81 (5th Cir. 1982) (same).
149. See Affiliated Capital,700 F.2d at 233, 236 (mayor "gave his blessing" to market
division by Houston businessmen which constituted "naked restraint"); see also opinion
below, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1016 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("The actions of Mayor McConn were
those of an active co-conspirator not content merely to accede to the wishes of private
parties. In addition, the actions of the councilmen and other agents of the City demonstrate the City's vigorous involvement in orchestrating certain aspects of the conspiracy.").
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ciety of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States 5 ' has fueled debate over the permissible content of a city's rule of reason
defense.' 5 1 Although the problem had been identified prior to
Boulder,I 2 the dissenters exacerbated it by declaring that antitrust
precedent prohibited all but procompetive justifications. 5 3 In Engineers, the Court had rebuffed a private professional association's defense to price fixing, which was based on the premise that
keeping prices high was essential to prevent cutthroat competition
among engineers and its inevitable byproduct, unsafe construction.' 54 In light of the Court's suggestive footnotes in Boulder and
Lafayette, however, Engineers' "sweeping and somewhat misleading"' 5 5 assertions can be easily limited to cases involving private
self-regulation. The rule of reason could thus be recast to fit the
context of municipal antitrust liability, a possibility acknowledged
in the Boulder dissent.'5 6
150. 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (Stevens, J.), quoted and explained in Boulder, 455 U.S. at
65-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist read Engineers out of context. See
infra note 153.
151. See supra note 144.
152. See Note, supra note 50, at 539 & n.158 (arguing that Sherman Act's breadth and
judicially defined "exceptions to the competitive regime" permit rule of reason which encompasses "governmental interest defense").
153. 455 U.S. at 65-66. But see Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694
F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.):
Although there is language in some Supreme Court opinions, notably ...
Engineers ...,to the effect that the only thing to consider in deciding whether a
practice violates the Sherman Act is the effect on competition, it is unlikely that
the Court meant to overturn the established proposition that the antitrust laws do
not require the impossible-a competitive market under conditions of natural
monopoly. . . . If a market has room for only one firm, it would be an effort
worthy of King Canute to keep two firms in it.
Judge Posner has also cautioned that "Engineers' sweeping and somewhat misleading language regarding the scope of the Rule of Reason must be read in context. . . .Acceptance
of [defendant's] argument could only have been predicated on a fundamental mistrust of
consumer capabilities. . . that, if indulged by the Court, would have undermined the rule
against price fixing." R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 143, at 261. The "consumer ignorance" argument was also made and rejected in Maricopa,457 U.S. 332 (1982).
154. 435 U.S. at 693-95.
155. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 143, at 261.
156. See 455 U.S. at 67. One commentator (a city attorney for Boulder) has already
referred to "the new rule of reason suggested in footnote 20 of the Supreme Court's [Boulder] opinion." de Raismes, supra note 136, at 16. A body of precedent exists, especially in
the boycott area, in which political and other noncompetitive considerations excused defendants from antitrust liability. For a catalog of these cases, see Springer, Guarding
AgainstAntitrust Risks, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 98 n.5, 106 & nn.25, 27 (J.
Siena ed. 1982). Cf. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 n.23 ("Marketing efficiency is not the
only legitimate reason for a manufacturer's desire [to impose restraints]. As a result of
[legal] ... developments, society increasingly demands that manufacturers assume direct
responsibility for the safety and quality of their products. . . .The legitimacy of these
concerns has been recognized in [rule of reason] cases .... ").
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Yet, even as the dissenters lamented the prospect of subjecting
cities to a rule of reason analysis without room for public benefit
justifications, they argued that "rejecting the rationale of. . .Engineers to accommodate the municipal defendant opens up a different sort of Pandora's Box."' 5 7 The purported evil is the rebirth

of economic due process'

in the guise of antitrust scrutiny. But

the now-discredited use of the fourteenth amendment to "enact

Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"' 5 9 bears little similarity to
the application of the antitrust laws to cities. 160 None of the municipal antitrust cases has involved attacks on social welfare legislation of the type invalidated inLochner v. New York. 16 ' Rather,
they involve challenges to licensing, land use decisions and zon-

ing, methods of supplying city services or conducting city-owned
businesses, and granting of concessions and franchises.

62

Fur-

thermore, if the solicitousness displayed by courts in the state action cases 163 is any indication, antitrust review of such activities
will probably be far less intrusive than feared.
In their eagerness to resolve the substantive issues in favor of
cities, commentators have devised various liability tests which all
but ignore antitrust. These include abandoning per se treatment
of city conduct"6 and modifying the rule of reason to permit a
157. 455 U.S. at 67.
158. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 803 (1978).

159. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. As Justice Holmes observed, "[s]ome. . . laws embody convictions or prejudices
which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to
I. (emphasis added). Unlike a constitution,
" Id.
embody a particular economic theory .
the Sherman Act is a congressional fiat embodying principles that originated with Congress, and is supported by nearly a century of interpretive precedent. See Sullivan, supra
note 67, at 9 ("Antitrust is basically a commitment to maintain competition. It has been
American policy now for nearly a century."). Although some have ascribed a constitutional breadth to the Sherman Act, the courts are obliged to respond to Congress' will and
cannot take blame for the lack of precision in the statute's drafting. See Lafayette, 435

U.S. at 398 & n.16; R. BORK, supra note 143, at 408-18. The evil of judicially created
economic rights exemplified byLochner is not present in antitrust. Note, supra note 71, at

296 n.192; cf. Cirace, supra note 29, at 484-85 (advocating substantive due process standard
for determining state action immunity).

161. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (fundamental "liberty of contract" guaranteed by 14th amendment invoked strict scrutiny of state statute restricting bakers' hours; in striking down statute as infringing liberty of bakers' employers, Court thereby countenanced sweatshops).
162. See generally ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 93-177 (J. Siena ed. 1982) (col-

lection of essays focusing on particular local government activities to which antitrust has
been applied).
163. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 142.
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federalism defense for "traditional" municipal functions,16 5 a
"public policy" defense (which "would apply if an anticompetitive

municipal regulation bore a rational relationship to a 'legitimate
local purpose' and its effects do not "clearly [outweigh] its putative local benefits"),1 66 or a "public welfare" defense (requiring
"proof that a restraint. . . is rationally related to the municipality's authorized police powers,. . . is nondiscriminatory in effect,
and. . .[has] no viable less restrictive alternative"). 67 Such proposals are vague, troublesome to apply, and unnecessary. Existing

antitrust law already provides the tools for accommoding the special role of cities.
2.

The Solution.: United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
68

Co.1

A scant eight years after Congress passed the Sherman Act, the
Sixth Circuit produced what Judge Robert Bork has called "one

of the law's most brilliantly suggestive and neglected opinions"
and "one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in
the history of the law."' 69 Due largely to his influential explication
and praise, the Addyston doctrine of "naked" and "ancillary" restraints, after surviving a seventy-year burial in antitrust
casebooks, has had glimmers of its wisdom surface in recent
Supreme Court opinions. 7 . As in the case of licensing musical
165. 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 273-74.
166. Id. at 274-76; see also Note, supra note 50, at 539 (proposing three-pronged governmental interest defense: city must show (1) "that the activity furthers a legitimate, competing governmental interest"; (2) "that the means chosen . . . do not have an
unreasonable anticompetitive impact"; and (3) that the means "substantially further the
governmental purposes asserted").
167. Note, supra note 71, at 293-95.
168. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modifled and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
169. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 21, 26.
170. Ironically, Engineers is one of these. 435 U.S at 689 ("The Rule of Reason...
has been regarded as a standard for testing the enforceability of covenants in restraint of
trade which are ancillary to a legitmate transaction.
...
). Unfortunately, the Court
went on to state "that the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."
Id. at 691 (relying on Chicago Boardof Trade, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). The Court thus
misunderstood the key contribution of Addyston--that an ancillary restraint is one that
promotes efficiencies or otherwise effectuates the purpose of a legitimate transaction. See R.
BORK, supra note 143, at 28.
The other Supreme Court case to draw upon the doctrine of naked and ancillary restraints, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, did so without explicitly acknowledging reliance on
Addyston. 441 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1979). There, the Court correctly perceived the true distinction between naked restraints (those "with no purpose except stifling of competition," id. at
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compositions,

71

Judge Taft's concept of ancillary restraints is

7
uniquely suited to evaluating the legality of municipal conduct. 1
TheAddyston analysis, as distilled into modem terms by Judge
Bork, looks initially to the purpose of the main transaction to de17 3
termine whether the challenged restraint is the "sole object"' of
the parties, or "subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate
transaction," making that transaction "more effective in accom-

plishing legitimate purposes." 174 If the sole object, the anticompetitive conduct is deemed a "naked restraint" and condemned as

illegal per se.' 7 1 Under this inquiry, most city conduct would escape application of the per se rules, 176 which should allay some of
20) and ancillary restraints ("market restraints reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights
that are granted [by copyright]," id. at 19). See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
171. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The sole inquiry before the Court was
whether ASCAP and BMI's system of blanket licensing (as opposed to per-use licensing)
constituted a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act-illegal price fixing by copyright
owners. Id. at 18. The analysis employed in Broadcast Music thus mirrored Addyston's
initial characterization inquiry, see id. at 18-19, and its subsequent focus on effect, see id. at
19-24.
172. Cf.Shenefield, Best Cases and Worst Cases, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 126 (J. Siena ed. 1982) ("[E]ven if a perfectly sensible governmental purpose exists,
the conduct will be examined in terms of whether the collateral restraints exceed that lawful main purpose.").
173. Addyston, 85 F. at 282-83.
174. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 27.
175. Id. Considerable confusion surrounds the label to be attached to the Addyston
analysis-whether it reflects merely the characterizationof conduct (as a per se offense or
one requiring rule of reason scrutiny) or whether the analysis itself constitutes a rule of
reason. The Court in BroadcastMusic believed it was engaged solely in characterization.
441 U.S. at 19 & n.33. Actually, theAddyston test as explicated by Judge Bork subsumes a
portion of the rule of reason inquiry: the examination of purpose and effect. Restraints
which pass the purpose and effect tests would be subjected "to the other tests of the rule of
reason: market share and specific intent." R. BORK, supra note 143, at 267 (emphasis
added). For clarity's sake, the analysis presented in this Note avoids the "characterization"
and "rule of reason" dichotomy by viewing the proposed standard as a single test. A practice not alleged as unlawful per se would thus escape the initial question whether the restraint is "naked."
176. Municipalities should have no difficulty surviving,this limited ends analysis by
showing that the purpose of the main transaction is a "public purpose" or furthers the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note
72, at 110; cf. Note, supra note 50, at 540 ("review of governmental purposes should be
quite limited"). But cf. 1981 Term, supra note 78, at 275 & n.47 (" 'incantation of a purpose
to promote the health or safety' should not completely insulate local governments from
antitrust scrutiny" (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670
(1981))).
Demonstrating that the challenged restraint is subordinate or collateral and furthers the
main purpose might be modeled on BroadcastMusic. There, defendants demonstrated that
the copyright laws and market practicalities required arrangements whereby numerous
copyright holders could deal with and enforce their rights against multitudes of users. 441
U.S. at 18-21 & nn.29, 33. Compare Boulder, 455 U.S. at 45-46, 47 n.10 (city imposed
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the fears voiced in the Boulder dissent. Simultaneously, the rules'
utility would be preserved for use against truly "pernicious" na177
ked restraints.
The next stage of the Addyston analysis gauges the effect of
those restraints which are not the sole object of the transaction.
To survive, the restraint must "be no broader than the need it
serves."' 178 Again, the purpose of the main transaction becomes

the focus, "suggest[ing] the measure of protection needed, and furnish[ing] a sufficiently uniform standard" for judicial determination.179 Yet, even those restraints deemed ancillary may be
condemned under the Addyston rationale if they are part of an
overall monopolization scheme.' 80 Thus, in Judge Bork's words,
the Addyston "doctrine of naked and ancillary restraints offer[s]
the Sherman Act a sophisticated rule of reason, a method of preserving socially valuable transactions by defining the scope of an
8
exception for efficiency-creating agreements."' '
The Addyston test's focus on the purpose of the underlying
transaction would enable "public benefit" to enter the inquiry at
the outset. To avoid per se treatment, a city need only show that
its purpose in instituting the anticompetitive displacement is providing a lawful benefit to the public,'8 2 and that the restraint is
moratorium because "petitioner's continued expansion during the drafting of the model
[cable television] ordinance would discourage potential competitors from entering the market"; district court held no per se violation appeared before it), with Affiliated Capital,700
F.2d at 228-30, 236 (city permitted group of local businessmen to divide up cable market
among themselves, which "served only to eliminate competition"; per se violation). The
application of the "naked restraint" criteria would abolish anticompetitive regulations
which aid only private interests with no benefit to the public. Cf. Note, supra note 71, at
297 (violation shown where city conspired with private business because no public service
rationale exists); Note, supra note 50, at 543 (municipal regulation may serve little or no
public interest).
177. The utility of per se categorization has long been recognized. See supra note 142.
178. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 266. This requirement should not be confused with
the "least restrictive alternative" requirement imposed by some courts as part of the rule of
reason inquiry. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 630 F.2d 262, 303-04
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). But see GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55
n.29; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1138 n. 11 (9th
Cir. 1982) (same case on appeal from Supreme Court's remand).
179. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 28 (quoting Addyston, 85 F. at 282).
180. Id.; see Addyston, 85 F. at 291; cf. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 404, 405 n.31, 417.
181. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 30. Judge Bork acknowledged, however, that the
ancillary restraint doctrine is not the totality of rule of reason inquiry, since even ancillary
restraints must still be tested for power and intent. Id. at 267.
182. SeeAddyston, 85 F. at 287 (emphasis added):
The main purpose of such [exclusive dealing] contract is to furnish sleeping-car
facilities to thepublic. The railroad company may discharge this duty itself to the
public, and allow no one else to do it, or it may hire some one to do it, and, to
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subordinate or collateral to accomplishing that purpose.18 3 Then,
to assure the legality of its conduct under the ancillary restraint

doctrine, a city must demonstrate that the restraint does not ex-4

ceed what is reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose. 1
This analysis would conceivably validate all vertical restraints,1 8 5
while ancillary horizontal restraints would be subject to the addi-

tional tests of market share and specific intent. 186

secure the necessary investment of capital in the discharge of the duty, may secure
to the sleeping-car company the same freedom from competition that it would
have itself in discharging the duty. The restraint upon itself is properly proportioned to, and is only ancillary to, the main purpose of the contract, which is to
secureproperfacilities to the public.
Judge Bork has interpreted this language as validating all vertical arrangements. R. BopxK,
supra note 143, at 29 (emphasis added). It would certainly validate awards of exclusive
franchises in potential natural monopoly situations. See Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of
Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126-27 (1982) (Posner, J.); cf.A4filiated Capital,700 F.2d at 234
(requiring competition before franchise is granted).
183. This requirement would prevent a city from imposing restraints solely to enhance
revenues, for although enhanced revenues undoubtedly benefit the public, their achievement would not be collateral or subordinate but would constitute the main purpose or "sole
object" of the restraint. Cf. Kurek v. PleasureDriveway & ParkDist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1977), vacatedandremanded,435 U.S. 992, reinstatedpercuriam, 583 F.2d 378 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Note, supra note 50, at 540.
184. R. Boax, supra note 143, at 266; see Addyston, 85 F. at 282 ("[Il]f the restraint
exceeds the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void for two
reasons: First, because it oppresses the covenantor, without any corresponding benefit to
the covenantee; and, second, because it tends to a monopoly."); cf. Note, supra note 50, at
540-41 (city must show its "objectives could not be furthered as effectively through competitive means"). Judge Bork explained this requirement as one of efficiency-creating economic integration, so that "lawyers forming a partnership," for example, "could lawfully
agree on fields of exclusive specialization (which is market division) and the fees each
should charge (price fixing), while the same lawyers, if they were not in partnership, could
not do these things lawfully." R. BoRic, supra note 143, at 28. While admitting that efficiencies may result from naked agreements and that integration may accompany them,
Judge Bork concluded that these "may safely be ignored as either nonexistent or de
minimi, ...
.[and] are very unlikely to survive the test of market power or the test of
intent." Id. at 268. But.cf. Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 997 (3d Cir.
1982) ("The district court would not be justified in looking into the wisdom or efficiency of
using the [state] regulation in question as a means of accomplishing the intended
objectives.").
185. R. Boiuc, supra note 143, at 29 (conceding that current antitrust law is otherwise).
186. Id. at 267, 268; see Addyston, 85 F. at 291 (even in cases where economic integration exists, restraint not "saved. . . from invalidity" if "actual intent to monopolize...
appear[s]"); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 143, at 261 (growing trend in lower
federal courts to require proof of relevant market in rule of reason cases and dismiss if
defendant has small market share). Thus, if an ancillary restraint, proper in other respects,
is instituted with predatory intent, it could be deemed unlawful. Cf. Westborough Mall v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to thwart normal
zoning procedures and directly injure plaintiffs); Mason City Center Ass'n v. City of Mason
City, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981)
(conspiracy to subvert normal commercial bidding to exclude plaintiff, coupled with use of
zoning for similar purpose).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:303

Absent a strict and unwarranted application of Engineers to
municipal defendants, noncompetitive justifications would be factored into Addyston's rule of reason equation. Indeed, characterizing restraints as naked or ancillary, and determining whether
they are no broader than the need they serve, mandate reference
to the city's main purpose in imposing them. 8 7 It is erroneous to
conclude that enhancing competition is the only permissible goal
justifying restraints-Addyston'srationale (and Judge Bork) have
unequivocally included the "purpose. . .to secureproperfacilities
to the public."'8 8 A restraint would be upheld if it enables efficient provision of public services or benefits, and is "properly proportioned to" that goal.' 89
Besides providing a useful framework for reevaluating the
traditional per se offenses and accommodating public purposes,
the Addyston analysis is sufficiently focused to prevent overintrusive judical review. At the same time, the test is neither excessively deferential to municipalities, as is federal preemption, 90
nor potentially overintrusive, as are the proposed tests modeled on
commmerce clause review of state regulation. 9' Moreover, the
Addyston test derives from antitrust law and has already been explored by antitrust courts. Its use in municipal antitrust cases
would resolve the anomaly of treating cities as private parties for
state action immunity purposes and as public for purposes of substantive antitrust scrutiny-'9 2 Finally, the Addyston approach
would eliminate the uncertainty, potential unfairness, and costly
commitment of judicial resources involved in developing a sepa193
rate body of municipal antitrust law.

III.

THE TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY: AN ISSUE FOR CONGRESS

Perhaps the most strenuous criticisms of municipal antitrust
liability have been voiced in the context of the antitrust penalties, 94 specifically, the treble damage and attorney's fee provision
187. See supra note 182.
188. 4ddyston, 85 F. at 287, quoted in R. BORK, supra note 143, at 29; see supra note
153.
189. .4ddyston, 85 F. at 287, quoted in R. BORK, supra note 143, at 29.

190. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
191. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (intrusive review); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (same). But see Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Corp., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (extreme deference).
192. See supra note 128.
193. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
194. While the private treble damage action, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), is the overriding
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for private litigants.195 This outrage1 9 6 reflects a deep awareness.
that the treble damage remedy is overharsh, overblunt, and poten-

tially debilitating. Since antitrust judgments have been notori1 and the cost of litigation fabled,1 98 the doomsday
ously large 97
scenarios' 99 may not be farfetched. Yet, for all their validity, the
objections have been too narrowly confined-the negative effects

of treble damage liability cut across the public/private line.
A.

The Public/PrivateDistinction

Opposition to municipal antitrust liability in general, and the
furor over the treble damage issue, stem from a notion that penal-

ties appropriate to deter private conduct somehow become intolerable when that conduct is public. While local government
decisionmaking is to be shielded from the "chill" of in terrorem
damage suits,20 0 corporate management is left out in the cold.
While fiscal havoc may be wreaked on blameless investors and

employees, cries go up in defense of the innocent taxpayer.2"'
20 2
Public officials serve the public, corporate managers do not; inconcern in municipal antitrust literature, the antitrust laws also provide for private actions
for equitable relief, id. § 26, Justice Department suits for criminal penalties, id. §§ 1-2,
and/or equitable relief, id. §§ 4, 25, and Federal Trade Commission cease and desist orders, id. §§ 21(b), 45(b).
195. Id. § 15; see supra note 17.
196. E.g., Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 442-43 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Areeda, supra note 6, at 435; Civiletti, supra note 78, at 385-86; Howard, supra
note 29, at 38; Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine andthe New Federalism ofAntitrust, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 345-46 (1982); Spiegel, supra note 7, at 166; Note,
Antitrust TrebleDamages asApplied to Local GovernmentEntities: Does the PunishmentFit
the Defendant?, 1980 ARiz. ST. LJ. 441.

197. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Civiletti, The Boulder and Lafayette Decisions: Antitrust or Anti-Citie?, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERN-

MENT 183-84 (J. Siena ed. 1982); Note, supra note 196, at 414-15.
198. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440-41 & n.31 (Stewart, J., dissenting); K. ELZINGA &
W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 72-77 (1976);

Howard, supra note 29, at 38.
199. E.g., Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A judgment of this
magnitude would assure bankruptcy for almost any municipality .... The prospect of a
city closing its schools, discharging its policemen, and curtailing its fire department in order
to defend an antitrust suit would surely dismay the Congress that enacted the Sherman
Act.").
200. See, e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); FEDERAL SYSTEM,

supra note 5, at 493; Areeda, supra note 6, at 439, 451; Civiletti, supra note 78, at 387.
201. See, e.g., Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 441 & n.32 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Civiletti, supra
note 78, at 385-86; Note, supra note 196, at 416-17; Note, supra note 50, at 548-49; 1981
Term, supra note 78, at 276.
202. See supra note 200.
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vestment is voluntary, taxes are not;2° 3 employment is fungible,
residence is not.2"
These arguments are grounded in a dichotomy which arose
primarily through developments in legal doctrine aimed at pro-

tecting private property rights.2" 5 The public/private distinction
ensured legal protection for the "private" corporation and justified state restraint of the municipal corporation. 20 6 Yet "developments in the twentieth century have significantly undermined the
'privateness' of major business corporations, with the result that

the traditional bases for distinguishing them from public corporations have largely disappeared."20 7 The distinction between public and private managers has been eroded by the rise of the
"corporate conscience" and the imposition of statutory controls on
official conduct.20 8 Moreover, corporate shareholders might have
less control over asset management than taxpayers,20 9 who have
access to the political process.2 10 The voluntary/involuntary distinction has been convincingly rebutted, 21 ' as has the notion that
the functions of public and private corporations can be differentiated.2 12 Therefore, instead of confining criticism of the treble

damage remedy to the municipal antitrust liability context, atten203. See, e.g., Note, supra note 196, at 417; Note, supra note 50, at 549 n.217; 1981
Term, supra note 78, at 276.
204. See Note, supra note 50, at 549 n.217.
205. Frug, supra note 57, at 1101-05, 1130.
206. Id. at 1105-20.
207. Id. at 1129. But see Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraisingthe Right to
Vote in Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7 &
n.34 (1982) ("sanctioned possession of redistributive powers is unique to public bodies").
208. Frug, supra note 57, at 1131-32. According to Professor Frug,
to label the individual in civil society (such as in a private corporation) "private"
and a state employee "public" is to divide those who can lead an earthly life of
economic gain from those who must regard themselves as communal beings and
act in a heavenly fashion. This vision still retains a powerful influence on our
thinking. It delegitimates political activity since political behavior, of necessity,
falls far short of a heavenly standard.
Id. at 1131.
209. Cf id at 1130 (except for ability to sell, shareholders resemble taxpayers); D.
VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 371 (2d ed. 1979) (Although in theory shareholders have
ownership control, "[b]etween the theory and the reality falls the shadow of certain awkward facts which indicate that such shareholder control is-at least in many cases-purely
fictional.").
210. This, however, would not be true where municipal decisionmaking has extraterritorial impact. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
211. Frug,supra note 57, at 1133-36. Professor Frug's rebuttal is (1) that all exercise of
economic power, whether by government or private persons, is coercive; and (2) that the
decision to live and work in a particular city is no less voluntary than the decision to invest
in or work for a particular corporation.
212. Id. at 1137-38.
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tion should shift to the real issue-the weaknesses and drawbacks
of the remedy itself.
B.

The ProposedAmendment

Scholars have ably demonstrated that the private remedy
spelled out in section 4 of the Clayton Act has destructive negative

effects which outweigh its perceived benefits. Briefly, the list of
negative effects includes: (1) weakening or eliminating the incentive for consumers to ninimize their damages, 21 3 (2) encouraging

nuisance suits,21 4 (3) misallocating a costly and scarce resource,
the judicial system,2 15 (4) sapping corporate energies, 2 16 (5) "softening" competitive vigor by discouraging risktaking,2 17 (6) pro-

moting the "quiet life" by forcing settlements among rivals, 21 , and
(7) general unfairness to defendants. 2 19 Now that Boulder and the

fiscal plight of cities have brought these considerations to the forefront, Congress should seriously consider amending the remedy it

adopted in

1890.220

The amendment proposed here is simple: deletion of "three-

fold" from the damage language of section 4, and insertion of "in
the discretion of the court" directly preceding the cost and attorney's fee language.2 2 1 These alterations would reduce recovery to
actual damages 222 and bring private antitrust suits in line with the
American rule on litigation expenses.2 23 This would work a com213. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, supra note 198, at 184-90.
214. Id. at 90-95.
215. Id. at 95.
216. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353, 1354.
217. Id. at 1360-62, 1369-70.
218. Id. at 1370-72.
219. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 129, 1 331(b) (1978).
220. The Sherman Act initially contained the treble damage provision, ch. 647, § 7, 26
Stat. 209, 210 (1890); this section was superceded by section 4 of the Clayton Act, Pub. L.
No. 63-323, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
221. Section 4 would thus read: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . .and shall
recover [threefold] the damages by him sustained, and, in the discretion ofthe court, the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." (bracketed material has been deleted, italicized material is new).
222. See Shenefield, supra note 196, at 346-47 (advocating legislation reducing § 4 recovery to single damages); Reagan Administration Approves Proposalfor Antitrust, Intellectual PropertyBill, [1983] ANTrrrRUsT & TRADE REo. REP.(BNA) No. 1108, at 681 (Mar.
31, 1983) (summarizing cabinet-approved legislative proposal that would reduce recovery
under § 4 to actual damages in cases not involving per se violations); id. at 713 (reprinting
proposed amendment to § 4).
223. See K. ELZINGA & W. BRrr, supra note 198, at 72 ("Since the legal system of the
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promise between advocates of abolishing the private damage remedy in favor of exclusive government enforcement 224 and
2 25
proponents of preserving the existing section 4 for its punitive,
227
compensatory 226 and "private attorney general" functions.
While beguiling proposals for a judicially defined exception to
section 4 have been advanced,22 8 they suffer from three fundamental defects. The first lies in the absence of standards for deter-

mining which defendants merit an exception, and when.229
The
second lies in the mandatory language of section 4 and the questionable use of "judicial gymnastics ' 230 to circumvent it. The
third lies in the magnitude of the issue and the impropriety of

United States generally does not provide for the successful litigant to receive payment for
legal expenses from the loosing party, [§ 4's] provision is somewhat peculiar to antitrust.").
224. See, e.g., id. at 139 ("The solution to the problem of efficient antitrust enforcement
is the replacement of the present reparations-induced private action system by public enforcement armed with the single device of an optimal fine."); see also Austin, supra note
216, at 1372-73 (supporting exclusive government enforcement but indicating that given
current trend in Congress, measure unlikely to materialize).
225. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 447, 485 (1977)
("treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers"); 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 129, 311 (b).
226. See American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-76
(1982) ("treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims"); Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486 (treble damage provision designed primarily as
remedy); Sullivan, Breaking Up the Treble Play. Attacks on the Private Treble Damage
Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REy. 17, 42-43 (criticizing Professors Breit and Elzinga
for ignoring compensatory purpose of antitrust, and attacking proposals to cut back on
treble damages).
227. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 575 ("Treble damages 'make the remedy meaningful
by counterbalancing "the difficulty of maintaining a private suit"' under the antitrust
laws.") (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486 n. 10 (quoting Senator Sherman)); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L.
REv.467, 472-76 (deterrence, rather than compensation, is primary function of treble damage action).
228. See Note, supra note 196, at 421-31 (proposing rationales and methods for achieving municipal treble damage immunity); Note, supra note 50, at 544-49 (same); Recent
Development, supra note 96, at 1072-75 (unless preemption test adopted, plain meaning of
antitrust laws will be distorted by relieving cities of treble damage liability); cf. Boulder,
455 U.S. at 68 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (extolling preemption analysis as means of
avoiding problem of damage remedy).
229. See Note, supra note 196, at 421-31 (failing to define class of "municipal defendants" eligible for proposed damage immunity, or to address eligibility of nonmunicipal
governments); Note, supra note 50, at 549 (absent finding that Congress did not intend
treble damage awards against municipalities, courts would determine on case-by-case basis
whether damages are "unconstitutionally excessive").
230. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Grayson Elec. Co. v.
Sacramento Mun. Util., 526 F. Supp. 276, 281-82 (E.D. Cal. 1981) ("Section 4 explicitly
mandates the award of treble damages without respect to the status or identity of the
wrongdoer. This Court is without the power to rewrite Section 4 of the Clayton Act.").
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permitting courts to resolve it case by case. 23 1 As the Supreme
Court has recognized in a related context,2 32 such statutory alterations should be made by Congress. "Courts that refuse to make
basic policy choices for the legislature thereby force the legislature
to face and decide questions they had previously been content to
leave unanswered. In this way the courts help focus the issues
... and make the legislative process more responsible. 23 3
Amending section 4 of the Clayton Act would, in turn, make antitrust enforcement more responsible, and solve Boulder's thorniest
unanswered question in the process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After Boulder, municipal antitrust immunity survives subject
to the current state action test. Pro-city outcomes in lower courts
have somewhat blunted initial criticism of the Supreme Court's
stance. Courts should not, however, distort the state action test
merely to avoid the issues of substantive liability and remedy.
Rather, they should face the liability issue and develop a principled review mechanism to ensure fairness to city defendants. This
Note offers the Addyston test as such a mechanism. So that courts
are not deterred from finding municipal antitrust violations when
warranted, Congress should amend section 4 of the Clayton Act.
If,as this Note suggests, the existing remedy affronts notions of
fairness and efficiency, Congress should eliminate treble damages
not just in favor of cities but in all private actions.
SUSAN ABRAMSON

231. See Grayson, 526 F. Supp. at 282; cf.Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981) ("'The choice we are urged to make [existence of contribution
right among antitrust violators] is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies
can provide and courts cannot.' ") (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317

(1980)).
232. Texas lndustries, 451 U.S. at 643-47 (Congress proper body to create right of contribution under § 4).
233. R. BORK, supra note 143, at 83.

